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ADAM, EVE, AND EMMA: ON CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND MORAL WISDOM
By Thomas Morawetz*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the heart of every social institution and of every literary or legal
text are unarticulated assumptions about human nature and experience.
One remarkable and singular contribution of Professor Herbert Morris
has been to examine criminality and punishment to uncover their tacit
picture of experience. At the same time, he has used the many stories of
our culture-from Adam and Eve to Emma Zunz, from stories of child
rearing to psychoanalytic stories of neurosis-to investigate the moral
emotions and offer an illuminating analysis of guilt, shame, and
innocence. Finally, he has carried the lessons of moral philosophy and
introspection back to criminal law to describe the institutional
parameters of an improved system respectful of our mutual moral rights
and obligations. In this paper, I try to uncover the themes that make his
work so humanistic and compelling and compare them briefly with
alternative accounts of criminality.
II. ADAM AND EVE AND BEING HUMAN
In his essay, Lost Innocence, which is the fifth and final chapter of
On Guilt and Innocence,' Herbert Morris sums up the lessons of the
story of Adam and Eve:
To appreciate that there is evil in the world, to hold to no illusions about it, to
be serious about it, to have experienced its many manifestations, to have seen
as well as evil what allows for its being overcome, to see all that makes for
the good and to give it due weight-these seem among the essential
Tapping Reeve Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Connecticut School
of Law. I wish to thank my research assistants, Joseph Chambers, Peter Haberlandt, and
Thomas Stone, for their notable help and many insights.
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components of moral wisdom. They link closely with lost innocence. It is
surely this which partly accounts for the understandable conflict that one
might feel about God's command not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good
and evil and about our longing for some imagined Eden. There is good even
in evil: the good that makes possible a life of a certain depth and scope.
Professor Morris links lost innocence, moral wisdom, and "a life of
a certain depth and scope."3 By "depth and scope," I take it that he is
alluding, among other things, to the central role in an examined life of
reflection and self-reflection-not merely the capacity but also the
exercise of critical moral analysis and evaluation of one's actions and
those of others. "Depth and scope" must be reflected not simply in
one's thinking, but also in one's feelings and actions. Indeed we must
avoid the linguistic, conceptual, Platonic temptation to talk about
thoughts and beliefs, feeling and emotions, and actions as separable
dimensions of experience. Human nature, in the way it interests Morris,
cannot be cabined. Guilt, for example, involves thinking about one's
self and one's actions in a certain way-and is itself a way of feeling,
one that disposes a person to act and refrain from acting.
In this paper I will examine some of the parameters and
assumptions of the flourishing of human nature toward moral wisdom as
it is presented in Morris' essays. First, I will argue that, as a goal and
ideal, it shapes his account and justification of punishment. Second, I
will consider its roots in one kind of Freudian or psychoanalytical view
of what it is to be a human being. Finally, I will look briefly at
competing accounts of human nature and criminal responsibility that
seem incompatible with at least some of Morris's assumptions and
applications. In doing so, I will use as illustration the situation of Emma
Zunz in Borges' story of that name,4 the subject of Morris's most recent
essay. 5
2. Id. at 161.
3. Id.
4. JORGE Luis BORGES, Emma Zunz, in LABYRINTHS: SELECTED STORIES & OTHER
WRITINGS 132-37 (Donald A. Yates trans., New Directions 1st ed. 1962) [hereinafter
BORGES, LABYRINTHS].
5. Herbert Morris, What Emma Knew: The Outrage Suffered in Jorge Luis
Borges's "Emma Zunz," IND. J. HIsP. LITERATURES, Nos. 10 & 11 (1997) [hereinafter
Morris, What Emma Knew].
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III. METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES
In his seminal essay, Persons and Punishment, which appears as
Chapter 2 of On Guilt and Innocence,6 Morris defends what he calls
one's inalienable right to be treated as a person, 7 a right that human
beings have simply by virtue of being human.8 The essence of that right
is a matter of respect and responsibility. Respect for persons is
recognition that persons are autonomous but interdependent beings
capable of understanding alternatives for action, shaping their conduct
in accordance with rules, taking account of incentives and
consequences, choosing among possible actions, and deserving praise or
blame for those choices. All of these elements are presumed when we
say that persons are appropriately held responsible for their actions.
Treating someone as a person involves moving from an explanatory
framework of cause and effect to one dealing with reasons for actions,
justifications, excuses, and rules. Morris alludes to this latter way of
thinking as showing how "human beings pride themselves in having
capacities that animals do not." 9 This picture of human nature, he
reminds us, is one in which satisfaction at achievement' 0 is possible and
in which shame, resentment, gratitude, and pride are all appropriate
feelings and attitudes.
Nowhere in his writings does Morris directly confront what many
regard as the Achilles heel of this familiar description of persons or
human nature. For the most part he judiciously avoids the terms "will"
and "free will" per se, cognizant, one imagines, of the philosophical
baggage they carry. Methodologically, he uses philosophical argument
to clarify the terms with which we refer to experience, not to question
them. In the Austinian tradition, he tries to be as sensitive as possible to
the complexity of the "things we do with words,"'1 assuming that
illumination into human nature is to be achieved through linguistic
phenomenology, through inquiry into our understanding of what we
mean when we speak of guilt, shame, and innocence. Accordingly, if a
theory implies that choice is an illusion and feelings of satisfaction are
also illusory because they rest on assumptions about freedom of choice,
6. See MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 31-58.
7. Id. at 53.
8. Id. at 50.
9. Id. at42.
10. See MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 42.
11. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina
Sbisa eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 1975) (1962).
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so much the worse for the theory. Theories are tested by their
usefulness in explaining experience; the familiar elements of
experience, our familiar ways of referring to experience and
understanding it, on the other hand, are not in jeopardy simply because
they fail to fit the matrix of a particular theory.
When Morris offers criticisms, they are, in the Wittgensteinian
tradition, criticisms of mistakes generated by bad theories. In Persons
and Punishment, he contrasts familiar institutions of punishment, which
are examples of a practice of holding persons responsible for their
conduct and accordingly respecting their personhood, with proposed
institutions that "proceed... on a conception of man which appears to
be basically at odds with that operative within a system of
punishment." 12 In the latter framework, "when an individual harms
another his conduct is to be regarded as a symptom of some
pathological condition in the way a running nose is a symptom of a
cold." 13 He describes the contrast as a matter of responding to crime
with punishment as opposed to responding with therapy, and he argues
that the latter is a mistaken way to proceed.
What kind of mistake is the mistake of responding to crime with
therapy? Is it a conceptual mistake, one that follows from a mistaken
account or theory of human conduct? Is it a moral mistake, one that
involves ignoring the moral entitlements of persons, the respect which
they deserve? Note that the argument is not about where to draw a line
between responsibility and non-responsibility; Morris' concern is not
that some persons who are regarded as non-responsible, as excused, or
as having mitigated responsibility, should be held fully responsible.
The debate is about how to regard criminal conduct in general.
Arguably the mistake is both conceptual and moral. Morris says
that "[t]he right to be treated as a person is a fundamental human right
to all human beings by virtue of their being human. It is also a natural,
inalienable, and absolute right.' 14 Every person has this package of
rights that are inseparable from being "treated as a person."15 At the
same time, being a person is a matter of moral entitlement; to be treated
in a way that demeans one's personhood is to be morally wronged.
Is this concept of a person culturally relative? On one hand,
Morris' elaboration of the right to be treated as a person bears the
12. See MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 36.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 49.
15. Id.
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indelible marks of Western liberalism and individualism. He places a
premium on self-scrutiny and on scrutiny of our relations with others.
He assumes that any instance of unequal treatment-for example, of
offenders and non-offenders-and any deprivation of freedom needs
moral justification. As Brian Barry reminds us, the notion that
"inequalities are a social artifact"' 16 and that "doctrines should be open
to critical scrutiny and that no view should be held unless it has in fact
withstood critical scrutiny"'17 are liberal ideas, part of our shared legacy
from the Enlightenment.
On the other hand, the inherent rights of persons in his account are
universal. One is no less a person if one is born into a culture that is
hostile to certain inalienable rights. The moral wisdom that Adam and
Eve acquire after eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge is the
universal inheritance of all persons; the moral rights they have by virtue
of being persons is not dependent on a particular culture or a particular
history.
IV. ON BEING A PERSON AND BEING A WRONGDOER
Morris' account of personhood, the rights of persons, and moral
wisdom gives us a framework to address his account of punishment. In
Persons and Punishment, and a later article, A Paternalistic Theory of
Punishment,8 he criticizes and rejects what he calls a therapeutic model
of the treatment of offenders but endorses what he calls a paternalistic
model of punishment. Superficially, these claims seem paradoxical. A
therapeutic approach to offenders would seem to be motivated by the
purpose of rehabilitation, and rehabilitation, in turn, seems to require a
paternalistic attitude toward such offenders. Therapeutic methods and
paternalistic goals thus seem to be in harmony.
For Morris, therapeutic responses to wrongdoing have a narrower
focus. They are characteristic of a system in which an individual's
harmful conduct is "regarded as a symptom of some pathological
condition in the way a running nose is the symptom of a cold."' 9
Therapeutic treatment is administered as it would be for a disease; that
the disease is a matter of conduct or behavior rather than a condition of
16. Brian Barry, How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions, LIBERALISM AND THE
GOOD 44, 45 (1990).
17. Id.
18. 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263 (1981) [hereinafter Morris, A Paternalistic Theory].
19. See MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 36.
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mind or body is irrelevant.2° Morris' fundamental objection to such
therapy is that it violates the "natural and inalienable" right of all
persons to be treated as persons.21 To be treated as a person is to be
regarded and respected as a being whose behavior is a manifestation of
choice, a choice to violate the rules that are understood and accepted to
guide the coordination of interests for members of the community.
Moreover, the denial of the right to be so regarded "entails the denial of
all moral rights and duties. 22 Morris argues that it is "surely intuitively
clear that any framework of rights and duties presupposes individuals
that have the capacity to choose on the basis of reasons presented to
them, and... what makes legitimate actions within such a system are
the free choices of individuals. 23
The familiar system of social response and punishment that Morris
endorses is one in which the rules of law anticipate a particular
distribution of benefits and burdens and in which wrongdoers choose to
disrupt the fair distribution of such benefits and burdens, causing a
maldistribution.24 Punishment "restores the equilibrium.., by taking
from the individual what he owes, that is, exacting the debt."25
The main point here is the claim that the wrongdoer chooses to act
within a shared practice and implicitly signs on to the consequences of
his act, not the claim that equilibrium is the result of punishment.
Morris would concede, I imagine, that not all offenders benefit from
their crime, that not all crimes entail burdens on victims, and that
weighing the ostensible benefits and burdens is endlessly difficult and
controversial. As I read his account, it merely posits that offenders seek
to gain some benefit from their rule-violating acts, even just the
satisfaction of having broken a rule. It is appropriate to punish
offenders not because we must exact from them a burden that precisely
cancels their benefit and rectifies a balance, but because choosing to do
wrong inevitably creates stresses in a system of general rule obedience.
Under such circumstances, Morris claims, the general right to be treated
as a person entails the particular right to be treated as an actor who has
20. An intriguing fictional treatment of this situation is to be found in SAMUEL
BUTLER, EREWHON (1872).
21. See MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 50.
22. Id. at 56.
23. Id. A similar argument is made in response to the work of British
criminologist Barbara Wootton by H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 158-
186 (Oxford Univ. Press 1968).
24. See MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 34.
25. Id.
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chosen to unbalance the system. It entails, paradoxically, the right to be
punished.26
Although this defense of punishment is framed in terms of benefits
and burdens and trade-offs among them, it is not a utilitarian account.
Morris does not claim that a maximization of benefits is the goal of a
system of punishment or its justification. Rather, the actor who chooses
to attain a benefit by imposing a burden in violation of a rule inherently
deserves punishment. This is her entitlement, her right, regardless of
the consequences. The account, is also, he makes clear, not a retributive
account. "A paternalist, attached to the good of the wrongdoer, would
reject retributive justice and utility as the sole determinative criteria [of
punishment], and would propose a good to be realized that is
independent of these values. 27 Morris's objection to both retribution
and utility is the following. A paternalistic theory of punishment
"makes morally impermissible, despite what [a wrongdoer] has done,
[any punishment] that would be inconsistent with [the] fundamental
right [to be treated as a moral being], 28 while utilitarianism and
retributivism may in appropriate circumstances endorse such
punishments. The problem with both retributivism and utilitarianism is
that they allow us to treat wrongdoers as means rather than ends in a
morally inappropriate way. Utilitarianism allows us to punish them for
the greater good of the community, while retributivism sanctions
punishment to implement an abstract notion of justice.
The sense in which Morris's theory is paternalistic needs further
explanation. We saw that, in his rejection of a so-called therapeutic
model, he alluded to imbalances and advantages brought about by
criminal conduct and to punishment as a rectification of such balances.
This sounds like a concern with retribution. In its concern with benefits
and burdens it also borrows some of the language of utilitarianism.
Only in the later essay, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, does it
become clear that Morris' main focus is on the effects of punishment on
the offender and only secondarily on the effects on the system as a
whole, the community as a whole. The fundamental demand Morris
makes on punishment is that it show "complete respect of the moral
26. Id. at 32. See John Deigh, On the Right to Be Punished: Some Doubts, 94
ETHICS 191 (1984).
27. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, supra note 18, at 270.
David Dolinko discusses the ways in which Morris' theory is and is not retributive. See
David Dolinko, Thoughts about Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 545 (1991).
28. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory, supra note 18, at 270.
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personality of the wrongdoer." 29 The goal of punishment is to draw on
the wrongdoer's "imaginative capacity to take in the implications for
[his] future self of the evil [he] has done." The nature of wrong must be
"comprehended in the way remorse implies comprehension of evil
caused. 30  Ultimately, the wrongdoer must appreciate, as Morris says,
citing Socrates, "that he has done himself by his wrongdoing.., a
moral evil greater than he has done others. 31  Repentance, to be
significant, must be "freely arrived at and not merely a disposition
toward conformity with the norms. 3 2
In summary, then, a paternalistic practice of punishment elicits
from the offender empathy and a sense of guilt, and it does so by
appealing to her as an autonomous actor and a moral being. While
some of the results sought by other accounts of punishment will be
achieved by such a practice as well, they are of secondary concern. For
example, the wrongdoer will be deterred from further criminal conduct
because she will self-monitor her acts in morally sensitive ways.
Benefits will be achieved and burdens minimized to the extent that,
individual by individual, conformity with rules exists. Other results,
however, may not be achieved. It is not clear that Morris'
recommendations would achieve general deterrence as efficiently as a
regime of fear or that feelings of revenge would be gratified. But his
claim is that these latter ends cannot be satisfied by a morally acceptable
system of punishment.
Morris readily concedes that the practical, including political and
economic, difficulties in implementing his theory are formidable. His
analysis is emphatically a theoretical account, an examination of
punishment in the light of intuitively plausible moral parameters, and
not a concrete proposal. There is little reason to think that his
suggestions would be palatable politically. One can only guess at the
resources that would be needed to bring about a system with the effects
he has in mind. The problem is not merely economic but also
methodological. There is hardly agreement among psychologists and
other "experts" on behavior about the kinds of conditions and regimens
that would generally change wrongdoers into persons guided by moral
wisdom.
29. Id. at 266.
30. Id. at 265.
31. Id. at 268
32. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory, supra note 18, at 268. Cf. Jean Hampton,
The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 208 (1984). At
footnote 3, Hampton discusses her differences with Morris' theory.
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A second qualification is merely terminological. Critical as he is
of the term "therapy" in the context of treatments that annihilate
personal responsibility, Morris would have to admit that he himself is
proposing punishment that acts as a kind of therapy. Like the rejected
kind of therapy, his conception, Morris admits, entails a "forceful
intrusion into the lives of people, 3 3 but one that respects their nature as
moral choosers and actors. Intrusions are defensible to the extent that
they do not compromise that nature. It seems fair to say that
punishment, in Morris' sense, seems to have as its purpose the
transformation of moral potential into moral actuality. While the
wrongdoer can potentially respect the interests of others (and herself),
guilt, shame, and other moral emotions-as ingredients of self-
regulation-need to be made effective. The process seems to be a kind
of moral therapy.
V. HUMAN NATURE AND MORAL CHANGE
To the extent that Morris can be said to speculate about human
nature, he looks at what it is like to be a fully realized moral being and
how one becomes a reflective moral being. Moral experience, in his
convincing characterization of it, is a matter of acts, emotions,
dispositions, feelings, and beliefs inseparably combined. In Morris'
writings the issue of realizing one's moral potential-and what the
process is like-comes up in at least four different contexts. Adam and
Eve gaining knowledge of good and evil, children becoming morally
responsible adults, and psychiatric patients coming to take moral
responsibility for their actions offer three occasions for Morris to
explain significant aspects of moral experience and actions. And all
three, as I shall argue, shed light on the fourth context, the assumptions
and aims of a paternalistic account of punishment. According to such
an account, punishment's principal aim is to catalyze the wrongdoer's
potential for moral agency and moral feeling. I shall now consider the
ways in which three other contexts of moral development, all discussed
by Morris, can be compared with his discussion of the punishment
context and perhaps shed light on it.
33. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory, supra note 18, at 271.
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A. Adam and Eve
Morris describes Adam and Eve's loss of innocence in the
following way. "As the fruit manifests its magical powers.. . , Adam
and Eve acquire a sense of shame, experience a loss of innocence, and
standing before each other, experience shame before each other.
34
With this dawning of shame comes "the acquisition of the knowledge of
good and evil, the acquisition of the capacity to apply these concepts
appropriately, [which is] something that is an essential component of
any case of lost innocence. 35 He explains that
[l]oss of innocence gives us knowledge, then, not [merely] of what is right and
wrong ... , but a knowledge of evil and the set of dispositions to act and feel
that are connected with this knowledge .... The insight to which I have been
referring is fused with feeling, not contingently but necessarily so."
36
This experience is "essentially related to painful experiences whether
one grasps oneself as the subject or object of evil . . . .[While o]ne's
sense of right and wrong reflects itself principally in indignation and
guilt, one's sense of evil reflects itself in being abashed, appalled,
horrified."37
Morris' description of the character and experience of lost
innocence can easily be transposed to his discussion of a paternalistic
form of punishment. His account of the goal of punishment as a process
that realizes "the good of one's moral personality, 3 8 as one that elicits
"one's general character as a morally autonomous individual attached to
the good"39 is similar to his characterization of Adam and Eve after their
loss of innocence. This is curious because an alternative description of
lost innocence seems at least equally plausible. Why must the
dispositions attached to the loss of innocence be those that incline one
toward conformity with the good? Why must a sense of good and evil
be a matter of feeling horrified and appalled in the face of evil? It is as
easy to imagine Adam and Eve morally confused or morally corrupt as
morally wise. To be sure, I agree with Morris that loss of innocence
necessarily implies more than cognitive capacities, more than the ability
34. See MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 140
35. Id at 151.
36. Id. at 154-55.
37. Id. at 156.
38. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory, supra note 18, at 268.
39. Id. at 266.
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to understand acts in moral terms. It involves feelings of guilt and
shame; such feelings make moral knowledge possible. But the range of
feelings that Adam and Eve discover for the first time may dispose them
to feel and act in many different ways. Along with the knowledge of
good and evil may come envy, fear, and mistrust. Along with horror at
evil may come the perverse temptation to experience it firsthand.
One must distinguish, therefore, between the potential for moral
wisdom and the realization of it. It is gratuitous to assume that Adam
and Eve, in losing their innocence, have anything more than the
potential, anything more than inchoate feelings and perceptions that
may lead to diverse patterns of conduct and rationalization. If Morris'
description of lost innocence as the attainment of a kind of moral
wisdom is similar to the state of being we might seek to achieve through
paternalistic punishment, the description seems more fully justified as a
description of the latter than the former.
Anticipating this kind of objection, Morris observes that the story
of Adam and Eve telescopes a long process. "[T]he myth of Adam and
Eve eating the fruit and thereby acquiring knowledge of good and evil
surely collapses into a moment of startling illumination and
disorientation what must have been a gradual process in the
development of the human race and more to our purpose, so it may be
thought, its development within any single individual. '4° He adds that
"the tale can mislead if it suggests that the acquisition of the knowledge
of good and evil, the acquisition of the capacity to apply these concepts
appropriately, something that is an essential component in any case of
lost innocence, is an instantaneous achievement."' Adam and Eve,
therefore, are simplified models of moral development because they
lose their innocence and gain moral wisdom (on Morris' account) all at
once.
B. Children and wrongdoers
A second context of moral development, one that Morris himself
uses to illuminate the goals of paternalistic punishment, is the
development of children into adults. In introducing the topic of a
paternalistic account of punishment, Morris reminds us of what we
know about parents and children. "The child's developing individuality
and sense of personal responsibility require that others encourage in it a
40. See MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 150.
41. Id. at 151.
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sense of its own power and competence., 42 Later in the article, he
discusses this aspect of child rearing at length. "Sometimes, [parental]
coercion enters in with respect to matters that are moral .. . .Slowly
such values as obedience, respect, loyalty, and a sense of personal
responsibility are integrated into the young person's life."4 3 He explains
further that sometimes "because of punishment children come to acquire
an understanding of the meaning of a limit on conduct .... [P]articular
punishments that are chosen often communicate to children the peculiar
character of the evil caused by their disregard of the limit, the evil to
others and the evil to themselves." 4 He adds that this practice of
punishing is a "complex communication to the child, ' 45 one that elicits
appropriate feelings of guilt and a commitment to accept rules and
limits.
Thus, in an article devoted to a paternalistic account of criminal
punishment, Morris gives a much more detailed and nuanced account of
parental punishment of children than institutional punishment of adults.
He draws an illuminating analogy between the two and argues that they
are similar, that we have much to learn from the punishment of children
in punishing adult wrongdoers. But the shift from children to adults
seems to require very little adjustment of his argument. One might even
say that he bases the punishing of wrongdoers on the disciplining and
moral education of children.
Thus, he observes that, with adults as with children, punishment
aims to "promot[e] the good of one's moral personality." 4  Since "the
evil that he [the wrongdoer] has done himself by his wrongdoing is a
moral evil greater than he has done others, [h]is soul is in jeopardy as
his victim's is not.' '47 For this reason, punishment must be "a forceful
reminder of the evil that is done to others and oneself. Were it not
present, and were it imposed in circumstances markedly at odds with
criteria for its imposition during the process of moral development, only
confusion would result."48 Accordingly, "the wrongdoer is not viewed
as damned by his wrongful conduct to a life forever divorced from
others"; 49 rather, punishment aims to make wrongdoers "responsible in
42. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory, supra note 18, at 263.
43. Id. at 266.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 267.
46. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory, supra note 18, at 268.
47. Id.
48. ld.
49. Id.
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the sense that they possess a knowledge of and an attachment to the
values embodied in the society's laws.",50  Morris quotes Brandeis'
observation that "government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher."
5
'
In at least four ways, this assimilation of punishing wrongdoers to
punishing children is questionable, if not counterintuitive. First, parents
have a direct and immediate responsibility for the nurture of children
insofar as they create and manage the context in which dependent
beings come to first consciousness and self-consciousness. While good
parenting does not insure moral behavior, arguably no one plays a more
direct role in shaping the dawning of moral conscience than parents.
The state or the courts surely do not have this relationship with
wrongdoers. In an attenuated way, society makes up the collection of
influences that shape an individual's way of seeing herself and her
conduct. But the nurture of a dependent child has no direct analogue in
society's responsibility for the moral development of adults. Perhaps
Morris is arguing that society's responsibility for wrongdoers must be
reconceived in this way.
Second, blame attaches to adults in a way that it does not attach to
children. To the extent that children and adolescents are understood to
experience rapid and sometimes convulsive change in cognition,
emotion, and feeling, blame and responsibility are ascribed to them in
an attenuated sense. Of course we blame them and hold them
responsible, but we do so with the caveat that they are relatively
unformed, that their character has not quite crystallized, and that they
are merely on the way to becoming fully responsible adults. Again,
perhaps Morris is urging us to see wrongdoers more in the way we see
adolescents.
A third question that may be raised about the comparison of child-
raising and adult punishment is the assumption that, whatever else may
be the case, the wrongdoer is "not damned ... to a life forever divorced
from others. 52 No harm is so great, no "soul" so lost, that punishment
cannot effect a transition to a life of respect for others and for moral
rules. In the context of child raising, this is, for the most part,
uncontroversial. To the extent children are in process of being formed,
we see them as subject to benign influence. Giving up on a child as
unsalvageable runs against deep commitments. Can the same be said of
adults? Or, are at least some wrongdoers incorrigible? One does not
50. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory, supra note 18, at 267.
51. Id. at 268.
52. Id. at 267.
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have to believe in capital punishment to see long-term separation of the
offender from society to be appropriate in some cases, both from the
standpoint of deterrence and desert. Perhaps Morris is encouraging us
to reconsider this view.
Finally, we come to the conclusion that the wrongdoer does a
greater evil to himself than to his victim because his "soul is in
jeopardy." I confess a complete inability to measure harm to victims
against damage to the soul of the wrongdoer, and I lack any concept of
the integrity and robustness of the soul that allows me to entertain such
a comparison. In the context of child rearing, damage to the moral
potential of a child is very serious because such damage will have
consequences for a lifetime. One can make sense of the notion that a
child's soul is in jeopardy although one may prefer to speak of the
child's potential for empathetic relationships and moral self-control.
But with adult wrongdoers, it is arguable that damage is long-standing,
that repeated acts of serious harming do little to change the disposition
or nature of the actor but do a great deal to curtail the happiness, well-
being, and potential of victims.
Morris is committed to the view that wrongdoers are morally and
emotionally uncompleted individuals, ones who need and can benefit
from "reminders of the evil that they do to others and themselves," ones
whose moral personality needs prompting to emerge from its chrysalis.
Like Adam and Eve, children serve as models of beings in transition. I
have tried to raise some questions about the persuasiveness of the
comparison in each case and some misgivings about the underlying
theory of human nature.
C. Freud and Human Nature
Incomplete persons in transition are also the subject of
psychoanalytic theory. In The Decline of Guilt, Morris refers to Freud's
claim (in Civilization and Its Discontents53) that "the sense of guilt [is]
the most important problem in the development of civilization and...
the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness
through the heightening of the sense of guilt.",54 Morris concludes,
however, that "we may ourselves be in the midst of a transformation-
53. SIGMUND FREuD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DIscoNTENTs (James Strachey trans.,
W.W. Norton & Co. 1st Am. ed. 1962) (1930).
54. Herbert Morris, The Decline of Guilt, 99 ETHics 62 (1988).
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ironically guilt's slow demise after its slow ascendancy. '55 He argues
that "[t]hrough a confluence of factors . . . the truth, indeed the
rationality, of conceptions undergirding the practice of guilt have been
thrown into question., 56 He explains that "[a] person who feels guilt
holds to beliefs of a certain kind, feels a certain way, and is disposed to
feel and act in certain specific ways . . . . [Such a person] has
internalized norms and, as such, is committed to avoiding wrong ....
[I]n feeling guilt, [such a person] turns on oneself the criticism and
hostility that one would have visited upon others had they done
wrong. '57
In Decline of Guilt, Morris concludes that many "factors-
increased anxiety, diminished capacity for identification with criminals,
alienation, devaluation of law, and devaluation of justice-all put
pressure upon guilt and pull us powerfully toward responding to
wrongdoing and wrongdoers from the perspective of social efficiency
and social control. ' 8 As a result, "we are witnessing lessened respect
for guilt and a lessening of our sense of guilt. ' 59 In assessing "whether
good or evil attend[s] this change, ' 60 he suggests the latter and
comments that Freud fails to understand "the important respects in
which guilt and our sense of guilt mark our attachment to others, to
values outside ourselves, and how bleak life would be were these
absent.",
61
In discussing "nonmoral guilt," in his article of that name, Morris
explains that nonmoral guilt, for example guilt over one's thoughts
unaccompanied by action or guilt over one's financial status or physical
well-being, is evidence or marks of "identificatory ties with others. 62
Although he explores the phenomenon of neurotic, excessive, obsessive
guilt, he argues that not all forms of nonmoral guilt are neurotic,
irrational, or undesirable.
If the purpose of a paternalistic mode of punishment is to realize
the wrongdoer's potential for appropriate guilt and empathy and to turn
55. Id. at 70.
56. Id. at 71.
57. Id. at 66-67.
58. Morris, The Decline of Guilt, supra note 54, at 74-75.
59. Id. at 75.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 76.
62. Herbert Morris, Nonmoral Guilt, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE
EMOTIONs: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 220, 240 (Ferdinand Schoenman ed.,
1987).
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her into an autonomous and responsible person guided by moral
consideration, it is hard to distinguish it from the purposes of
psychotherapy and similar interventions. Arguably, the pathology or
incompleteness Morris attributes to wrongdoers, the condition that
makes them appropriate subjects for paternalistic punishment, is
comparable to the condition of patients in therapy. Even if one cannot
say that Morris bases his understanding of wrongdoers on a Freudian
model of neurosis, a common model of human development underlies
both.
Consider four similarities. First, when Morris argues that
punishment must respect "the moral personality of the wrongdoer," 63 he
has in mind respect for someone who is capable of feeling the pain of
others, experiencing guilt, understanding norms, and acting
appropriately. That seems the appropriate stance of the psychotherapist
toward her patient, the requisite degree of respect. Second, when
Morris says that the wrongdoer harms himself more than he harms his
victim, that questionable judgment becomes understandable if one sees
the wrongdoer as someone whose neurotic patterns of maladaptation
inhibit proper function as a morally responsible person. We are
interested in neurosis to determine the harm the neurotic does to
himself; we only have the same focus of interest with wrongdoers
insofar as we attend to them as patients. Third, the aim of a paternalistic
mode of punishment is, according to Morris, the return of the wrongdoer
to a society in a role of responsibility and moral citizenship. This may
seem curiously parochial in its disregard of other aims and interests,
unless the psychoanalytic analogy is made central. The aim of the
therapist/patient relationship clearly is the well-being and well-
functioning of the patient. Finally, an emergent theme in recent writings
on psychotherapeutic method is transformation of the patient from
someone who disowns her actions to someone who claims authorship
and responsibility.64 The goal of a paternalistic regime of punishment
would seem to be the same. The wrongdoer would return to the moral
community as someone self-consciously guided by incorporated moral
principles, by moral feeling-extending beyond moral guilt to the non-
neurotic forms of nonmoral guilt.
65
63. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory, supra note 18, at 266.
64. See, e.g., RoY SCHAFER, LANGUAGE AND INSIGHT (1978), and A NEW
LANGUAGE FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS (1976).
65. In Nonmoral Guilt, Morris concludes that guilt over one's thoughts and over
such matters as unjust enrichment reflect a moral posture of identifying one's interests
with those of others and that such a posture is hardly irrational or neurotic.
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D. Blame and The Stranger
I have compared the flourishing of human nature that Morris
subsumes under a paternalistic regime of punishment with three other
transitions-that of Adam and Eve becoming outcasts, that of a child
becoming an adult, and that of a successful psychotherapy. In each case
the transition is to what Morris would call "a life of a certain depth and
scope, [one characterized by] the capacity to apply [knowledge of good
and evil] appropriately, a set of disposition to act and feel.",66 An
appropriate sense of guilt, ready empathy, and critical self-
understanding all play essential roles in that orientation. My guess is
that, of all the iterations of this model of human nature, the
psychotherapeutic one is the default commitment that shapes Morris'
descriptions of the others.
If this is roughly correct, it prompts a conundrum about Morris'
view of criminal law and morality. We saw that Morris' convincing
objection to any account of wrongdoing as a form of illness is that it
shortchanges or even denies an essential attribution of responsibility and
blame, an essential aspect of respect for the wrongdoer as an individual
who chooses to act. But the psychotherapeutic model does not carry the
implication of blame. The reason is not simply the pragmatic one that
blaming a patient can set back the therapy rather than advance it. The
reason is rather that the patient, by the very nature of her relationship
with the therapist, is in transition. Assuming responsibility is part of the
therapeutic process, part of a managed transition. But the blaming
inherent in legal/criminal judgment and generally in moral judgment is,
by contrast, a branding. It focuses on harm that cannot be taken back,
and the future prospects of the actor-what she might do, see, feel, and
understand-are irrelevant. Similarly, with Morris' two other examples,
Adam and Eve and the transition of child to adult, the process of
becoming a morally responsible human being is the point of each
example, and blaming serves at most the admonitory function of moving
the process along.
67
Morris' paternalistic account of punishment subsumes an account
of human development along a trajectory which culminates in "the
66. See MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1.
67. This observation is about blaming others, not necessarily about blaming
oneself or assuming blame. The latter may indeed be an aspect of becoming
responsible.
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morally autonomous individual attached to the good" 68-an ideal that
involves distinctive beliefs, feelings, dispositions, and attachments. The
ideal roughly fits our goals in child-raising, our understanding of the
goal of psychotherapy, and the plight of Adam and Eve. But the kind of
blame inherent in criminal judgment involves a different model, one
according to which the actor at the moment of wrongdoing is fully
responsible, one according to which any individual trajectory of
development is irrelevant.
The strains between these two models of human nature can be
illustrated by Albert Camus' great and influential novel, The Stranger
(L'Etranger).69 There are many ways of looking at the protagonist,
Meursault, and I will not strain your patience by offering one. I shall
remind you only of a fundamental tension between seeing the novel as a
story of transition and entertaining the demands of criminal judgment.
Meursault, facing execution, comes to see life as development and
possibility. "Try as I might, I couldn't stomach this brutal certitude.,
70
"I came to the conclusion that what was wrong about the guillotine was
that the condemned man has no chance at all, absolutely none. In fact,
the patient's death had been ordained irrevocably. It was a foregone
conclusion., 71 Those judging him have no patience with transitions,
have no inclination or reason to hedge their presuppositions about
blameworthiness. However distracted, however dissociated-and
Meursault is both when he commits his crime-the eyes of law see him
as fully responsible, fully a legal and moral agent. As readers, we see
the shallowness, even the irrelevance, of that assumption. If Meursault
does not quite present himself as childlike or as a patient for
psychotherapy, he is incomplete as a moral agent.
The novel begins with the death and funeral of Meursault's mother.
Meursault seems distracted, almost indifferent, at the funeral. In his
trial, the prosecutor uses this fact against him to show hard-heartedness.
Is his response to his mother's death relevant to his legal guilt for
homicide? Of course not. But, ironically, I am not sure how to see it
from Morris' perspective. It is surely relevant to an understanding of
his moral capacities, his development as a moral person. How, in the
end, should such an understanding color our determination of his legal
guilt or innocence?
68. See Morris, A Paternalistic Theory, supra note 18, at 266.
69. ALBERT CAMUS, THE STRANGER (1954).
70. Id. at 137.
71. Id. at 139.
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VI. EMMA ZUNZ REVISITED
Emma Zunz, the protagonist of a short story by Borges, 72 kills
Aaron Loewenthal, who owns the factory in which she is employed and
who once framed her father for embezzlement. Imagine that she is tried
for homicide under a modem criminal code. The reader is privy to the
fact that she constructs a false scenario of rape and self-defense. From
the standpoint of the reader's understanding, she is guilty of intentional
murder. She presents no obvious defenses, either in mitigation or
exculpation of her crime.
How might Emma be punished? Would a paternalistic mode of
punishment be appropriate? As I read her story, and I think Morris, in
his extraordinary essay on Emma Zunz, 73 would agree, her problem is
not that she lacks "a life of a certain depth and scope, 74 that she needs
to be brought to a full understanding of guilt, shame, and innocence, and
that her potential for moral agency needs to be realized. If we look back
at Morris' description of "the essential components of moral wisdom, 75
she seems to have them in full-she "appreciate[s] that there is evil in
the world,', 76 she "hold[s] to no illusions about it,",77 she has
"experienced its many manifestations, '78 she has seen "as well as evil
what allows for its being overcome,, 79 and she has arguably "seen all
that makes for the good and [given] it its due weight., 80
Emma's criminality is not explained by lack of moral feeling or
moral agency. She commits a crime because the story she tells herself
about good and evil and her role as a moral agent is not the story that
the law tells in determining culpability. She manipulates the appearance
of the situation to conform with law's story, but we who have access to
her thoughts know better.
If we generalize the lesson of Emma's criminality, perhaps many
wrongdoers do not lack moral agency and moral feeling but rather see
themselves as central actors in a moral drama that does not correspond
to the way law-abiding citizens see themselves. In his influential book,
72. See BORGES, LABYRINTHS, supra note 4.
73. See Morris, What Emma Knew, supra note 5.
74. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 161.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 1, at 161.
79. Id.
80. See id.
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Seductions of Crime, Jack Katz argues that wrongdoers see themselves
as moral agents within complex moral narratives. "Central to all these
experiences in deviance is a member of the family of moral emotions:
humiliation, righteousness, arrogance, ridicule, cynicism, defilement,
and vengeance. In each, the attraction that proves to be most
fundamentally compelling is that of overcoming a personal challenge to
moral ... existence." 8'
We can give two different accounts of the relation of moral
experience to wrongdoing. Both are accounts of transition. According
to one account, there is a universal trajectory of development towards
moral wisdom. Appropriate feelings of guilt and shame, and the actions
and reactions to which they give rise, are distinctive characteristics of
autonomous and responsible moral actors. Children, neurotics, and
wrongdoers are in one sense or another incomplete or arrested in their
progress through this trajectory. In particular, wrongdoers are assisted
by a paternalistic mode of punishment.
According to the other account, wrongdoers have rich moral lives
and are guided by guilt and shame. The feelings and actions that are
functions of guilt and shame are not necessarily appropriate or
inappropriate, but they do conflict with the norms that society imposes.
The stories that wrongdoers tell themselves about their responsibilities
and the acts that fit these stories are morally complex. The actors
themselves inhabit two worlds at the same time, the world according to
their feelings and beliefs and the world that judges them. They are in
transition not along a trajectory, but they are buffeted by conflicting
moral universes.
According to the first account, blaming wrongdoers is problematic
because their moral responsibility is, by hypothesis, incomplete, only
partially realized. According to the second account, blame is
understandable insofar as they are completely realized moral agents.
The dilemma that underlies these accounts is, of course, not about
wrongdoing at all but about human experience. The optimist will say
that we are on the path to moral wisdom and harmony with others. The
pessimist will say we are doomed to participate in conflicting stories
about our moral selves and our responsibilities unto death.
In emphasizing the role of guilt as a moral emotion that helps
explain self-understanding and our moral relationships with others,
Herbert Morris is not transparently an optimist. But I think his
81. JACK KATZ, SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME 9 (1988).
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optimism is of a sophisticated kind, one that is mindful of the
impossibility of Gardens of Eden and mindful as well of the human
realities of self-reflection and guilt, respect for others, and
responsibility. He demonstrates how, within those parameters, life is
worth living richly. He argues that each of us, wrongdoers no less than
others, has a right to such a life.

